Circuit Split Watch: Attorney's Fees in Prisoner Litigation

This article first appeared in the November 5, 2013, issue of the National Law Journal’s Supreme Court Brief.

Mary Murguia, one of the newest judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, recently took on two of her longest serving colleagues in a dispute over attorney’s fees in prisoner litigation. Murguia has another appeals court, the Sixth Circuit, on her side. The U.S. Supreme Court could be asked to resolve the split.

Judge Stephen Reinhardt, joined by Judge John Noonan, wrote the majority opinion in Woods v. Cervantes. Both have served on the Ninth Circuit since the 1980s. Reinhardt is still active; Noonan has taken senior status. Murguia joined the Ninth Circuit in 2011, though not as a rookie. From 2000 until her elevation, she served as a federal district judge in Arizona.

In the Ninth Circuit case, a California prison official improperly denied dental care to prisoner Earnest Woods, causing him pain and suffering for more than a year. A jury awarded Woods $1,500 in compensatory and punitive damages. After also winning on appeal, Woods sought attorney’s fees totaling $16,800.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act caps attorney’s fees at 150 percent of a money award for “any action brought by a prisoner.” Beyond that limit, “fees shall not be awarded.”

Reinhardt ruled that Woods was entitled to collect his attorney’s fees,** finding that the cap applies only to fees for a trial, an action brought by the prisoner, but not to appeals brought by prison officials.

Murguia, the former district court judge, disagreed, calling the majority’s attempt “to evade the statute’s clear meaning…unconvincing.” The trial and appeal are parts of the same action, she stated.

Citing a unanimous 2004 decision by the Sixth Circuit, Riley v. Kurtz, Murguia urged that the attorney’s fee cap apply to both the trial and appeal. The Supreme Court declined to review the Sixth Circuit case at the time.

“The majority has created a circuit split by awarding attorney fees the statute says ‘shall not’ be awarded,” Murguia concluded.

Reinhardt acknowledged the circuit split, but countered that “we are not required to follow the initial circuit to decide an issue if our own careful analysis” yields a “contrary result.”

The state of California, representing the prison official, filed a petition for rehearing en banc in August. California argued that the majority opinion “blows the lid off the statutory attorney’s fee cap that Congress enacted to lessen the financial burden of prisoner litigation on governmental officials and, ultimately, taxpayers.”

In September, the University of Montana Law School’s Criminal Defense Clinic responded for Woods, accusing the petition of “overriding hyperbole.” The response suggested allowing the issue to percolate through additional circuits.

The Ninth Circuit had directed the clinic to respond to the petition, indicating some level of interest in taking up the matter en banc. Responses to en banc petitions are not automatically allowed.

If the en banc court declines to step in, the case could reach the Supreme Court soon.

Attorney’s fees are already on the high court’s radar.

In the new term, the Supreme Court will hear two cases about fees in patent disputes. Companies have complained that they are forced to settle infringement lawsuits, even frivolous ones, because the costs of litigation are too high. They hope the justices will make it easier to collect attorney’s fees, to deter so-called patent trolls.

Last term, the Supreme Court decided an attorney’s fee case in the context of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and another, without argument, in an abortion protest clash.

Murguia’s brother Carlos is a federal district judge in Kansas, their home state. The two are the first brother and sister pair of federal judges. Another sister, Mary’s identical twin Janet, is the president of the National Council of La Raza, the largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States.

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**On the exact amount of attorney's fees to award, the majority referred the matter to its Appellate Commissioner.

Unlikely Lame-Duck Vote in 1980 Still Reverberates

This article first appeared in the December 19, 2012, issue of the National Law Journal’s Supreme Court Insider.

Thirty-two years ago this month, one day after John Lennon was killed, the Senate confirmed Stephen Breyer to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Looking back, this 1980 vote on a future U.S. Supreme Court justice was remarkable and historic in its timing, speed, and long-term consequences.

In November 1980, Jimmy Carter lost a landslide election to Ronald Reagan, and Republicans won control of the Senate. Just days later, though, President Carter nominated Breyer to the First Circuit, and the lame-duck Senate confirmed him in December.

Citing the Congressional Research Service in a press release two weeks ago, Senator Chuck Grassley noted that, in addition to 2012, “the Senate has confirmed judicial nominees during a lame-duck session in a presidential election year on only three [other] occasions since 1940” (1944, 1980, and 2004).

Breyer was the only judge confirmed in the 1980 lame-duck session; in other words, he was in a category by himself between 1944 and 2004.

Breyer moved from nomination to confirmation in less than a month, which was not completely out of the norm then. Other circuit judges confirmed earlier in 1980 had gotten votes in short order. The Senate confirmed Breyer’s future colleague, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, only two months after her nomination to the D.C. Circuit. Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt was the exception with a nine-month gap.

Today, Breyer’s one-month lag time would be almost unthinkable, particularly for a circuit nominee. President Obama nominated William Kayatta in January of this year for a Maine seat on Breyer’s former court, the First Circuit. Despite support from Maine’s two Republican senators, Kayatta has not yet been confirmed. Two pending circuit nominees have been on hold even longer.

Without the quick, once-in-a-blue-moon vote in 1980, Breyer would have had a long wait for another opportunity. Republicans controlled the White House for the next twelve years.

Breyer served on the First Circuit during that time and beyond, eventually presiding as chief judge when President Clinton nominated him to the Supreme Court in 1994.

Clinton could have nominated Breyer to the Supreme Court without circuit experience, but the odds are against it. The last ten nominees to join the Court, except Elena Kagan, were all circuit judges.

Perhaps Breyer could have been nominated to a circuit court soon after Clinton’s election and had a short stint below. David Souter sat for only five months as a circuit judge before being confirmed to the Supreme Court, as a nominee of President George H.W. Bush.

No one can know for sure what would have happened, because lightning struck for Breyer in 1980, and the rest is history.

So, why did Breyer’s 1980 nomination go through?

Boston Globe articles at the time point to at least two reasons.

Breyer, who was serving as chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee when nominated, impressed senators from both parties.

“It’s a rare personality that can survive two years in Washington and gain the admiration of a liberal Democrat like Edward Kennedy and an arch-conservative like Republican Strom Thurmond,” the Globe explained. However, “Breyer managed to do it.”

The Globe also reported that the two parties may have struck a deal. Republicans would support the Breyer nomination, while Democrats would not push a stack of other pending judicial nominees. Republicans helped force a vote on Breyer when a block was attempted and then helped confirm him.

Circuit Split Watch: When Sanctioned Attorneys Can't Pay

This article first appeared in the August 29, 2012, issue of the National Law Journal’s Supreme Court Insider.

Federal appellate courts are split over whether money sanctions issued against an attorney can be reduced when he cannot afford to pay. The question has also split conservative and liberal thought leaders, in unexpected ways. The Supreme Court, which recently decided another costs case, could be asked to resolve the split.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, a respected conservative jurist, has at least two suggestions for errant attorneys who cannot afford to pay: Take it up with the bankruptcy court and possibly find a new career.

In 2009, Easterbrook, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel in Shales v. General Chauffeurs Local Union No. 330, explained that a § 1927 violation “is a form of intentional tort….Damages depend on the victim’s loss, not the wrongdoer’s resources.” If the attorney cannot pay the sanction, he could seek relief in bankruptcy. Further, if the attorney “is poor because people are not willing to pay much, or at all, for his services, then he should turn from the practice of law to some other endeavor where he will do less harm.”

Last month, 9th Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, who has been called a “liberal lion,” rejected the 7th Circuit’s conclusion in Haynes v. City & County of San Francisco. The statute says that the court “may” require an attorney to pay costs, not “must” or “shall”—a clear signal to Reinhardt and the other two panel members that the lower court has discretion to order and adjust costs. He noted that the 2nd Circuit also adopted this “plain meaning” in Oliveri v. Thompson, a 1986 case.

Ordering “sanctions in an amount many times greater than the attorney will ever be able to pay” can be “a futile gesture that does little” to make victims whole, Reinhardt reasoned.

Ironically, the Reinhardt and Easterbrook approaches could be seen as an ideological swap, with the liberal Reinhardt playing the role of textualist and the conservative Easterbrook looking for context outside the words.

While costs will never grab the headlines in the way that affirmative action, same-sex marriage, and other cases in the Supreme Court’s current inbox will, they have gotten the Court’s attention as a day-to-day part of litigation that affects many people.

In May, the Supreme Court decided a costs case involving a different statute. Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. clarified that costs awarded for interpreters include only oral translation expenses. Like the pending attorney-costs split, Taniguchi also involved a split between the 7th and 9th Circuits—resolved in the 7th Circuit’s favor. (This column previously highlighted Taniguchi.)

Before the attorney-costs issue can reach the Supreme Court, though, there may be a rehearing en banc.

The sanctioned attorney has indicated that he intends to seek rehearing. Although he won on the possible reduction of costs (to be determined on remand by the district court), the 9th Circuit opinion also said that he “engaged in a wide variety of incompetent and unprofessional actions.” The circuit issued a separate unpublished memorandum opinion to that effect.

The 9th Circuit has set an October deadline for his petition.

Prop. 8 Argument: As Expected, With Some Twists

The Prop. 8 argument in a tweet: At least two votes on the merits for striking Prop. 8, if merits reached at all. Panel much as expected, with some twists.

On Monday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8, which defines marriage as between a man and a woman. Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Michael Daly Hawkins, and N. Randy Smith heard sessions addressing standing and the merits (totaling roughly 2.5 hours).

Charles Cooper argued for Prop. 8 during both sessions, joined in the first by Robert Tyler for Imperial County. Opposing Prop. 8 were David Boies, during the first session, and Ted Olson, joined by Therese Stewart for San Francisco, during the second.

On standing, the judges were somewhat difficult to read. For instance, Judges Reinhardt and Smith, billed in advance as the liberal and conservative, respectively, both had critical questions for Boies. Smith inquired about the governor's role following a voter initiative. By law, the governor cannot veto such an initiative, so why should he be able to nullify it by not appealing? Reinhardt expressed concern about overturning the voters' initiative and wondered if the standing question should be certified to the California Supreme Court. Reinhardt also doubted Boies' assertion that the district court's injunction of Prop. 8 only applies to the two defendant counties (not Imperial or other counties, conveniently weakening Imperial's standing).

As it happened, though, Imperial's standing appeared weak anyway. For instance, Judge Smith questioned whether the county deputy clerk only performs ministerial duties related to marriage, casting doubt on her standing. Judge Hawkins appeared particularly frustrated with the county, admonishing Tyler to answer yes or no and stop wasting time.

As a side note, Judge Hawkins maintained a very serious (somewhere between "measure twice, cut once" and "take no prisoners") manner and facial expressions throughout the hearing, adding to the intensity of his effective, pointed questions. Judge Reinhardt, on the other hand, enlivened the long argument with occasional humor, for example, ribbing Boies about losing to Olson in Bush v. Gore.

During the merits session, the judges appeared to line up more clearly and as predicted, but not completely. Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins both equated the Prop. 8 case with Romer, where the Supreme Court struck down a voter-approved provision stating that gays were not a protected class in Colorado. When Cooper attempted to distinguish that provision as broader than Prop. 8, Judge Hawkins asked, "So, if you take away a bunch of rights, that's bad. But if you just take away one right, it's OK?"

Perhaps unexpectedly, Judge Smith questioned the rational basis of Prop. 8, since California allows domestic partnerships. In essence, why provide all the rights of marriage to gay people, minus the marriage label? What is the rational basis? However, Judge Smith did seem willing to consider the procreative nature of heterosexual marriage as a possible rational basis for Prop. 8.

No matter the result, today's argument is just a step—albeit an important one. The panel decision, whatever it is, will be appealed, given the deeply held views on both sides.

Thus, the appropriate closing summary tweet may well be: Both sides begin looking at Circuit Rule 35-1 (en banc rehearing) and the Supreme Court Rules.